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A quick glance at Husserl's Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis:
Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Hua XI) would seem to bolster Zahavi's claim. In this work, Husserl discusses the "fundamental stratification" of the life of the ego (Hua XI, 64) into the passive and the active "levels" of consciousness. As such, this work seems to suggest that there are only two layers of consciousness at work, and hence that Zahavi must be correct in the debate with Brough and Sokolowski. However, I intend to show that a more careful examination of the Analyses will show that there are, in fact, three levels of consciousness at work even in this text. Their grouping into two levels-passive and active-helps explain an ambiguity that gives rise to the Zahavi v.
Brough/Sokolowski debate, and the analysis provided of the passive sphere and its relationship to the active sphere in fact helps us better understand the nature of the difference between all three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X. As such, I hope to be able to use the Analyses to mediate the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski. I will begin by summarizing the core issues of the debate and suggesting that what is at stake in this discussion is a particular issue of objectivity (Section I). Then, I will suggest a way to map the three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X onto the two levels discussed in Hua XI, and vice versa, by suggesting a new three-fold distinction between active synthesis, passive association, and internal time-consciousness (Section II). Next, I will discuss the issue of objectivity as it pertains to passive association (Section III). I will then end by explaining how passive association and internal timeconsciousness can help us make sense of the two levels of constituting consciousness that are at the heart of the Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski debate (Section IV). In doing so, I
hope to help establish a common ground that could help provide a solution to the problem raised by this debate.
I. The Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski Debate
From the outset, it must be noticed that this "debate" consists mainly of Zahavi's critiques of Brough and Sokolowski, followed by his elaboration of what he takes to be a more accurate account of Husserl's theory of consciousness.
2 At stake is a proper understanding of what Husserl means by the following passage:
2 Zahavi's most in-depth discussion of this issue occurs in Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999); hereafter cited in-text as SA. He also discusses it in other workds, including: Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic, 1998); Zahavi, "Self Now that we have studied time-consciousness . . . it would be good to establish and run through systematically for once the different levels of constitution in their essential structure. We found: 1. the things of empirical experience in objective time (in connection with which we would have to distinguish still different levels of empirical being, which up to this point have not been taken into consideration: the experienced physical thing belonging to the individual subject, the intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics); 2. the constituting multiplicities of appearance belonging to different levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time; 3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness. (Hua X, 73 ).
Zahavi's interest in this passage is primarily with Husserl's theory of selfawareness. He claims that Brough and Sokolowski hold acts to be immediately given, even prior to reflection, as full blown inner objects distinct from the absolute flow of consciousness, which is also given to itself (SA, 70). On such an interpretation, Zahavi claims, the primary givenness of acts of consciousness is an object manifestation, 3 which yields too easily to a "reflection theory" which he is at great pains to disprove. 4 The problem with the Brough-Sokolowski position as Zahavi sees it is that it suggests that the act is not self-given, but is brought to givenness by something else (i.e., inner timeconsciousness). Hence, it merely "defers" the problem of self-awareness to the level of inner time-consciousness, which leads, Zahavi contends, either to an infinite regress problem or is forced to posit "an implicit or intrinsic self-awareness" that can be posited 3 Using the grammar of vocabulary, Drummond will say that it puts awareness in the case of the accusative, rather than the genitive case that properly characterizes self-awareness; cf. John J. Drummond, "The Case(s) of Self-Awareness," in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 199-220; 199-201. 4 Zahavi lays out his problems with a "reflection theory" of self-awareness in SA, 14-37. in Husserl cannot adequately explain the need for the deepest level of the "flow" of consciousness because it does not adequately explain the connection between this flow and the acts of consciousness.
Zahavi attempts to solve this problem by linking the absolute flow of consciousness and the temporally constituted act to Husserl's notions of functioning and thematized subjectivity, respectively. 5 The main thrust of what Zahavi contends is novel in his approach is based on the assertion that "Husserl's investigation of inner timeconsciousness is nothing apart from an investigation into the temporality of prereflective self-awareness" (SA, 71) because "inner time-consciousness is simply the name for the prereflective self-awareness of our acts" (SA, 80). In other words, Husserl's account of inner time-consciousness is an account of the way in which the acts of consciousness show themselves to us even as they (also) give us something else (namely, the intentional object): acts are, therefore, both self-and hetero-manifesting (SA 71-72). 6 Hence, in
Zahavi's opinion, inner time-consciousness is not "a particular intentional act" but "a pervasive dimension of self-manifestation" that is a passive self-affection (SA, 72).
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Husserl's account of double intentionality is an elaboration of this model:
"Whereas the flow's constitution of the duration of its object is called its Querintentionalität, the flow's awareness (of) its own streaming unity is called its
Längsintentionalität" (SA, 73) . This second "intentionality" cannot be understood as an 5 This, in turn, can also be mapped on to the distinction between prereflective and reflective self-awareness; SA 71. Later on we will see in what ways the notions of functioning and thematized subjectivity can be mapped on to the distinction between passive and active strata of consciousness. 6 We will see below that I want to claim that it is passive association, and not inner time-consciousness that is both self-and hetero-manifesting. 7 Again, we will see below that I want to claim that this realm of passive affection cannot be equated solely with inner time-consciousness, but must be distinguished between ITC and passive association. Zahavi, it is precisely, and only, the issue of pre-reflective v. reflective awareness that makes us able to distinguish between the second and third levels of constitution elaborated by Husserl (SA, 81). That is, for Zahavi, the two levels differentiated by
Husserl are but two different ways of looking at one and the same thing (SA, 80), namely, the flow of acts and lived experiences.
II. Are There Two or Three Levels of Consciousness?
But Zahavi's understanding of the layering of consciousness is not solely binary.
Rather, he seems to admit of a three-fold layering when he states that inner timeconsciousness can make us aware of the following three levels of consciousness:
1. "the transcendent objects in objective time (intentional consciousness)";
2. "the acts as demarcated temporal objects in subjective time (reflective self-awareness)"; 9 3. "the stream of consciousness (prereflective self-awareness)" (SA, 81).
However, given that the second and third levels of consciousness are but different modes of self-awareness, the heart of the matter for Zahavi seems to be a two-fold distinction between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation.
Zahavi claims that his position is supported by Husserl's distinction between functioning and thematized subjectivity. This distinction of Husserl's plays out in his analyses of passive and active synthesis. In this work, Husserl claims that the "fundamental stratification" of consciousness is its split into passive and active levels (Hua XI, 64) , which would seem to support Zahavi's two-fold focus. However, a closer examination of Husserl's analyses in Hua XI shows that there remain at least three levels of constitution, and hence three levels of consciousness, at work here. Further, the apparent similarity between Zahavi's self-and hetero-manifestation and Husserl's passive and active syntheses is not so readily apparent once one asks whether the distinction between functioning (passive) and thematized (active) subjectivity map onto Zahavi's pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness (which are two different modes of self-manifestation) or on to his distinction between self-and hetero-manifestation? If the latter, then how can we distinguish between the two different modes of selfmanifestation?
To begin to answer these questions, let us turn to Husserl's account of the relationship between functioning and thematized subjectivity. Husserl is adamant that thematized subjectivity presupposes functioning subjectivity: it is only because of passive syntheses that the ego is able to actively direct its regard (Hua XI, 120) . The essential elements of passive constitution are associative structure, affection, and attention.
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Attention must be understood as a "tending of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which 'appears' continually in the change of the modes of its givenness" (EU, 85) . This tending occurs because of affecting [Affektion], 11 that is, the allure [Reiz], "the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego" (Hua XI, 148) . 12 Without this affecting, Husserl is adamant that "there would be no objects at all and no present organized with objects" (Hua XI, 164 12 Though it must be emphasized that, as with the "attention" under discussion here, this pull is different from, and in a sense prior to, the ego's attentively turning toward an object: the pull or allure here is Reiz in German, which is often translated as "stimulus," which though perhaps misleading in some contexts is helpful to us here in indicating the manner or the level on which this "pull" occurs: just as the heat of the fire is a stimulus that prompts us to remove our hand without the active involvement of the ego but automatically, reflexively, so the allure of the object stimulates the ego to constitute it (i.e., the object), but to do so automatically, like a reflex, before the active involvement of the ego. 13 This recalling is purely phenomenological, happening within the epoche and hence distinct from the recollection of empirical and psychological notions of association; cf. Hua XI, 117-118. For those primarily familiar with the Logical Investigations, the use of "association" as a key term in Husserl may be surprising. In LI, Husserl is painstakingly detailed in his critique of empiricist and psychologistic uses of association. In this secondary sense, association belongs properly in the realm of "indication," and hence is accidental, rather than necessary, to the ego (unlike, for example, the eidetic functioning of the ego at work in expression; cf. LI I. § § 1-10). Derrida's reading of Husserl in La Voix et la Phénomène seems to point in the same direction as the later Husserl: association is essential to the ego's functioning. The point that remains to be clarified, however, is whether association, as it works in these later texts, still belongs in the realm of indication as it does when understood along the lines of the empiricists and psychologists. Husserl seems to suggest that it does (EU, 78), though this is not the time or place to pursue this question, or its relation to Derrida's argument in La Voix et la Phénomène, further.
done on the basis of similarity: that which is reproduced from the past is in some way like that which is perceived in the present. This type of reproductive association is "an absolutely necessary lawful regularity . . . without which a subjectivity could not be" (Hua XI, (118) (119)  cf. also Hua XI, 124) because in it "the entire past-consciousness is co-awakened" (Hua XI, 122) . Reproductive association enables our present consciousness to be united to our past-consciousness, and thus makes possible the historicity of the subject.
This historicity, in its turn, is shown to be necessary for the life of the subject through the second, "higher" level of association: expectations. Expectations are closely related to apperception, and hence to perception and the primary constitution of objects as what they are. My previous experiences are retained in a horizon "of actual and possible expectations" (Hua XI, 119 ) that enables me to experience any object as the object it is. This two-fold association must be kept distinct from internal time-consciousness.
While internal time-consciousness is a necessary presupposition of associative syntheses (cf. Hua XI, § 27), the two are not the same. Association is needed to "awaken" the associated objects, as retention and (especially) protention are empty. Without association, Husserl claims, internal time-consciousness would be "meaningless" (Hua XI, 125) because it abstracts from content, and hence cannot give us "any idea of the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the presents" (Hua XI, 128) . However, without internal time-consciousness and the temporalization of consciousness that it makes possible, the idea of association, either reproductive or expectative, would be impossible. Hence, association is founded upon, but distinct from, internal time-consciousness.
But association must also be kept distinct from the actively intentional acts of the ego. Association is a passive synthesis, as Husserl points out time and time again, and as such is distinct from active syntheses. 14 Indeed, the "specific intentions" of active consciousness arise from, and hence presuppose, passive syntheses (Hua XI, 118).
We are left, then, with three distinct levels of constitution:
1. active syntheses, i.e., specific, egoically-directed intentional acts;
2. passive associations;
3. internal time-consciousness.
The three distinct levels of constitution at work in the analyses of passive and active synthesis are reminiscent of the three levels of constitution in Husserl that we discussed earlier (from Hua X, 73) . If the parallel between the two lists holds, a clarification of the distinction between internal time-consciousness and passive association would help to mediate the debate between Zahavi and Brough/ Sokolowski.
In order to clarify this distinction, however, we must first examine it in light of the issue 14 Cf., for example, Hua XI, 120 where Husserl speaks of passivity as "the founding level of all the activelogical processes."
of objectivity, which we have already stated is the key issue at stake in the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski. In turning to an analysis of objectivity and passive synthesis, 15 then, we will hopefully be able to see a bit more clearly how and why objectivity is a central problem in the debate.
III. Objects and Passive Synthesis

A. Objects and Objectlike Formations
Association, in giving us things in the world, precisely does not yield for us objects. Rather, by bringing together similar hyletic data, association enables us to form "objectlike formations" [Gegenständlichkeit] . 16 These objectlike formations must still be acted upon by the ego to become fully formed objects. Specifically, they must be judged, the similarities held before the thematizing gaze and understood in their essences. It is only by passing through the tribunal of judgment that beings can appear for me as objects (Hua XVII, 69) .
Passing through the tribunal of judgment, then, marks the move from passive to active synthesis as a "quantam leap," a qualitative and not merely a quantitative difference. 17 The difference is between the unthematized thing of experience and the object of thought characterized by judgment. It is only with this last step, that of (active) judgment, that we can speak properly of objects (EU, 81 n.1). Properly speaking, within the sphere of passive synthesis, we have only tendencies, habitualities, 18 horizons.
B. Objectivity in Passive Association
Returning to the question of objectivity in the passive sphere, then, we see that we can speak, if not of objects then at least of objectivity (including objectlike formations), in the passive sphere. In fact, one can distinguish at least three different dimensions of objectivity in Husserl's account of passive synthesis: individual, intersubjective, and cultural. 19 The first is a weaker dimension of objectivity, limited as it is to a "single perceiving Ego-subject" (Hua III, (316) (317) . This is the type of objectivity attained by a single stream of consciousness and its "ideal perceptual multiplicities" (Ibid.). Here we see the most rudimentary ability of the subject to see unity in multiplicity. This objectivity is moved to a higher level when the object can be intersubjectively verified: in discussion, I can come to see that my perception of the object is like or unlike others' perceptions of it. The more agreement we can come to about the object, the greater its level of objectivity. Because it has been tested in the fire of multiple subjects' experiences, this level of objectivity is higher (more accurate, more verified) than that which is held by one subject alone.
But this model of intersubjective verification requires dialogue between different subjects, and therefore requires the involvement of active egos. It seems to be no longer passive, but active. But there is a non-active way for other subjects to be involved in the ego's constitution of objectlike formations: the cultural. Simply put, previous cultural achievements are "virtualized" (Hua VI, , and can then be sedimented in the Hua XV, 214, . 21 This is necessary, Husserl claims, to the constitution of ideal objects, which have a "persisting existence . . . even during periods in which the inventor and his fellow are no longer wakefully so related [to the object]" (Hua VI, 372) . This is to say that ideal objects have a "continuingto-be even when no one has . . . realized them in self-evidence" (Ibid.). Ideal objects, then, transcend mere historical occurrences or facts, even as they are based upon them:
ideal objects are types of experience that are clearly recognized by individuals as a "guiding norm for future engagements with the world." 22 As guiding norms for future engagement, they become candidates for sedimentation into the horizons of expectation discussed above.
C. The "Object" of Time-Consciousness
We have already shown above that time-consciousness and passive synthesis must be kept distinct: passive synthesis provides the content that gives time-consciousness meaning, while time-consciousness provides the temporalization of the subject that founds passive synthesis. 23 But can we mark this distinction beyond the seemingly Kantian language of form and content? I think we can, because the two levels of constitution seem to correspond to two distinct accounts of fulfillment: time-20 Husserl's prime example here is writing, a point that Derrida will make much of in his Introduction to the French translation of Husserl's Origin of Geometry (cf. Edmund Husserl, L'Origine de la géométrie trans. with introduction by Jacques Derrida. Paris: PUF 1962). 21 Cf. also Gyllenhammer, "Three Dimensions of Objectivity, " 194, 199 n.37. 22 Gyllenhammer, "Three Dimensions of Objectivity," 193. 23 In Husserl's words, we could say that, as a "lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general" (Hua XI, 117) , passive synthesis must conform to time-consciousness, the "universal, formal framework . . . in which all other possible syntheses must participate" (Hua XI, 125) .
consciousness achieves the general fulfillment of retained protentions and protended retentions in non-intuitive differentiation (cf. Hua XXXIII, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] , while passive synthesis achieves the particular fulfillment of the domain of intuition (Hua XXXIII, (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 227ff.) .
The "objects" of the two levels of constitution then are distinct: timeconsciousness is fulfilled by the retention of previous protentions, 24 that is, by elements seemingly within the realm of time-consciousness, 25 while passive synthesis is seemingly fulfilled by the intuition of the world, that is, of the amalgam of things in the world and my horizons of experience with them. 26 As such, the "objectlike formations" of passive synthesis are simultaneously directed at the world and within the self (its retentional horizons, etc.). As directed toward our horizons and partially constitutive of those horizons, passive synthesis achieves a small level of self-manifestation (the manifestation of the horizons of which they are themselves a part), while still maintaining, simultaneously, a measure of hetero-manifestation (the manifestation of the objectlike formations of the things in the environing world). This would seem to suggest that the second level of constitution marks, not a borderline between self-and heteromanifestation (as Zahavi suggests), but rather a transition that is also a connection 24 Cf. Ms. L I 15, 24a-b: "The earlier consciousness is protention (i.e., an intention "directed" at what comes later) and the following retention would then be retention of the earlier retention that is characterized at the same time as [its] protention. This newly arriving retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with its protentional tendency and at the same time fulfills it, but it fulfills it in such a way that going through this fulfillment is a protention of the next phase"; as translated in Lanei Rodemeyer, "Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Analysis of Protention," in Donn Welton (ed), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003): 125-154; 131. This constitutes an advance, of sorts, on Husserl's earlier claims that retentions retain retentions (Hua X, 81) . 25 In this way, time-consciousness achieves the "self-relatedness" (Selbstbezogenheit, Hua XXXIII, 207) necessary for the stream of absolute consciousness. 26 There is also a distinction in intentionality that must be accounted for here, that between Längsintentionalität and Querintentionalität, between the more general "tending toward" of Drummond's intentionalityD and the more specific "directedness to an object" of Drummond's intentionalityO; cf. Drummond, "Case(s) of " 217; and SA, 73. between them, 27 and hence not only a distinction between "levels," but also the maintenance of a single-if complex-account of self-awareness.
IV. Mediating the Debate
We have so far been at pains to show: 1) a parallel between the three levels of constituting consciousness in Hua X and the three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua XI (i.e., active synthesis, passive synthesis, internal time-consciousness); and 2) that the second level of the latter list (i.e., passive synthesis) contains a certain level of objectivity that is distinct from the objectivity of the first or third levels. What remains is to relate this back to the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski on the levels of consciousness in Husserl.
John Drummond has said that "[a]ny resolution to the dispute between Brough and Zahavi would have to account for how we might have two 'dimensions' or a differentiation within consciousness while preserving a single, albeit perhaps complex, notion of self-awareness." 28 The suggestion here is that perhaps the distinction between passive association and internal time-consciousness would enable such a differentiation without lapsing into the "reflection" theory which multiplies self-awarenesses.
We can maintain a single self-awareness only if we are able to avoid turning passive syntheses into an object of internal time-consciousness. I think that we have been able to do this without losing the ability to distinguish between distinct passive syntheses, and hence to distinguish between discrete experiences. In the first place, the "object" of 27 This would suggest the possibility of developing an explanation of the "parallel" between transcendental and empirical subjectivity, if the transcendental stakes of the debate were clearly elaborated in note 1 above. the "acts" of time-consciousness is only time-consciousness itself, and therefore, as long as passive association is distinct from time-consciousness, it cannot be the "object" of time-consciousness.
Secondly, the "constituting multiplicities" of passive synthesis (i.e., the associations themselves, and not the products of those association) provide us a distinct account of objectivity, namely the Gegenstandlichkeit of the sensible, environing world, 29 which distinguishes this type of objectivity from both the strong notion of the object that occurs in active synthesis and the more "formal" striving character of protentive timeconsciousness (Hua XI, 73) . Hence, there is a distinction between passive association and internal time-consciousness such that they cannot be the same thing (and hence, passive association cannot be the "object" of time-consciousness).
But this may not entirely solve the question of whether the passive syntheses are themselves objectivities, or whether they merely yield objectivities, even if it does seem to answer whether passive synthesis are the objects of time-consciousness. 30 This is a more vexing question; I would want to contend that passive syntheses are themselves objectivities (though certainly not objects) to the extent that they themselves, as distinct acts, are part of our sedimented horizons. The move from individual to intersubjective and cultural levels of objectivity would seem to entail an analysis of the effectiveness of our synthetic acts themselves: when presented with similar stimuli, do I consistently synthesize the world in the same way as do others? Even within individual objectivity 29 That is, the world of expectations that must be kept distinct from the "anticipations" characteristic of active synthesis, and from the protention of time-consciousness; for more on this distinction, cf. my dissertation, "Futurity in Phenomenology," especially Part One, "Futurity in Constitution and Transcendental Subjectivity." 30 Here again, we take the discussion past the focus exclusively on a theory of self-awareness out to larger philosophical issues.
and association, there is the question of the reliability of the syntheses themselves: am I, to borrow language from Analytic epistemology, functioning properly? 31 That is, when tendencies are at work in passive association, at least one of these tendencies must also apply to the constituting acts themselves: not only does some stimulus recall to mind previous, similar stimuli, but it also recalls that previous occurrences of similar stimuli have tended to yield productive expectational capabilities. Even if the effectiveness of these acts can only be judged in the realm of active synthesis via reflection (and therefore, perhaps, by being objectified, strongly speaking), this would seem to presuppose an already-existent, that is to say, in the language of self-awareness, prereflective, objectlike-formation, as no object can exist (in active synthesis) without a prior objectlike-formation being constituted in passive synthesis. There must, it would seem, be a certain degree of objectivity to our acts, even if they are not, strictly speaking, objects (and especially not the objects of time-consciousness). It is my hope that this distinction in objectivity will enable us to preserve the distinction between "dimensions" of consciousness without resorting to a "reflection theory" that makes one dimension the object of the other, and hence multiplies self-awarenesses.
Conclusion
I disagree, then, with Zahavi's elaboration of the levels of consciousness that provides the justification for his reduction to two distinct levels of consciousness (selfand hetero-manifesting) . 32 This manifests itself in a disagreement with some of Zahavi's claims regarding inner time-consciousness, for example, that it is both self-and heteromanifesting (SA 71-72), and that it is "simply the name for the prereflective self-31 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) . 32 Though I concede that my position remains consistent with Zahavi's on several important points.
